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
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
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RESEARCH REPORT

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
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AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE: KEY
ISSUES FOR THE 1990'S

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN H. MUMMA, USA
AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEREMIAH C.
RIORDAN

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE: KEY ISSUES FOR THE 1990'S
A POSITION PAPER

by

John H. Mumma
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

and

Jeremiah C. Riordan
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Thesis Advisor: Colonel Denis P. McGrath

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1987

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Air Base Ground Defense: Key Issues for the 1990's
A Position Paper

AUTHORS: John H. Mumma, Lieutenant Colonel, USA
and
Jeremiah C. Riordan, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Examines current issues affecting the implementation of the historic 1984 Army and Air Force Joint Memorandum regarding the defense of air bases from ground attack. The availability of US Army military police forces for dedicated Air Base Ground Defense is explored, as is the promised transfer of spaces from the Air Force to the Army. The need for enhanced security police training for the air base ground defense mission is underlined, as are serious deficiencies in command and control of air base ground defense forces. Ambiguities in intelligence support for air base ground defense operations are highlighted, as are shortfalls in indirect fire support for these same operations. A series of recommendations for air base ground defense planning staffs are proposed as an agenda for the success of these programs in the 1990's.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Mumma (M.P.A., Golden Gate University) has been an Army military police officer for 18 years. Spending six years overseas, he has commanded at company level three times, including a year in the Republic of Vietnam. He has been a staff officer at battalion, brigade, and installation level. He served as Provost Marshal for the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and has commanded a military police battalion. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, the FBI National Academy, and the Air War College, class of 1987.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeremiah C. Riordan (M.P.S., Auburn University) is a career Air Force security police officer. His interest in air base ground defense matters was fostered by his service in combat at DaNang Airfield in the Republic of Vietnam. He subsequently served in a variety of security police staff and unit assignments, primarily with Strategic Air Command. His most recent assignment was as Chief, Security Police and Security Police Squadron Commander at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, where his unit won designation as "Best in Air Force," and he won individual recognition in the Commander-In-Chief's Installation Excellence Award program. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College, class of 1987.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Defense of air bases from ground attack has taken a long time in resolution. For years, wise commanders have been concerned with rear area ground security at Army division, corps, and theater levels. The threat of Level I and II threat activity (see Appendix 1 for definitions), including SPETSNAZ operations, is nothing new. Commanders have devoted much time and effort to the rear area during all large land force exercises. Army Military Police (MP) forces, which operate to a large extent in the rear areas, are trained in the basic combat skills necessary to fight in the rear area. MP units are also more heavily armed than most other Army organizations in the rear area. Therefore, division, corps, and theater provost marshals usually collaborate with major support command operations officers (support commands are the largest Army units in rear areas) to develop plans to fight the rear battle. In this regard, division and corps provost marshals are usually involved in conducting vulnerability analyses and prioritizing assets and facilities to be protected. Since MP operate on an area basis to execute their area security mission (which includes rear battle), response by MP forces to a Level I threat has always been the exception. Whoever or whatever is hit is responsible for self-defense. MP respond to defeat Level II activity and also locate and attempt to fix Level III activity until relieved by a Tactical Combat Force (TCF). In the recent

past, that sufficed for the Army activities and facilities. What about air bases?

Through at least mid-1984, Army MP planners did not routinely consider an air base that existed within their area of operations (AO) as being an Army responsibility. In retrospect, it seems unbelievable that such an important asset could have been left out of Army vulnerability analyses. At best, it was unclear who was going to take care of an attack on the air base, and consequently air base defense was not incorporated into most Army plans. At any rate, any MP combat support to a threatened facility or unit was on a response basis. Nuclear storage and launch sites and major headquarters (at least corps or lieutenant general level) were the only facilities traditionally excepted, as they have always had dedicated MP support separate from the MP providing area security in the particular area of operations.

It took Generals Wickham and Gabriel to "fix" this Army oversight in 1984. Today, it is almost embarrassing that the Air Force planned to engage in ground combat outside an air base perimeter because it did not think the Army would be there to do it. (18:748) The 22 May 1984 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on US Army--US Air Force Joint Force Development Process got things going. Concept papers followed the signing of the MOA, an approved Joint Service Agreement on Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) was produced, (30) and a Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense was written. (29)

This paper highlights some unresolved contemporary issues regarding the implementation of the joint agreements. The intent is to

Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) contains a few Army National Guard military police companies for deployment to Southwest Asia. However, they are not dedicated to Air Base Ground Defense even though it was the Air Base Ground Defense initiative that triggered the inclusion of these units in the POM. They will be part of the overall area security mission performed by Military Police in the region. (14) Even with these deploying forces there will probably not be sufficient MP forces to dedicate units of any significant size to ABGD. The evolving Army "party line", at least from the MP perspective, is that ABGD must be accomplished on an area security mission basis. (9) MP forces in an area of operation will respond to an air base threat as they would to any other critical facility identified as requiring protection in a rear area.

It is undoubtedly time to put this issue to rest and to ensure that Air Force and Army planners know for certain that they cannot expect dedicated air base security forces from Army MP. The possibility of having dedicated forces is remote at best, as Army MP units will continue to be allocated to specific ABGD missions in accordance with their rear battle priorities as assigned by the Rear Battle Officer, through the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). (28)

command, Army MP School, and Department of Army representatives. The July 1986 Joint Operational Concept for ABGD (DA Pam 525-14/AFP 206-4) talks to both possibilities. Paragraph 9c describes MP units conducting ABGD being placed under the operational control (OPCON) of or being attached to the air base commander. (29:8) This certainly implies at least a semi-permanent relationship (a dedicated force). However, a paragraph immediately follows which describes MP units being assigned an area security mission as part of a larger MP organization and being placed OPCON to the air base commander only when required by the threat to the base. (29:8) This, of course, describes the responsive force mode of operations.

Both situations might theoretically exist, but the authors doubt it. Despite continuing efforts to move MP units higher on time-phased force deployment lists (TPFDL), it is doubtful that these efforts will meet with success. There are simply too many other higher priority combatant units to be deployed. In wartime, Commanders-In-Chief (CINCs) will need to generate combat power quickly, which means deploying combat arms units first. MP units are clearly in the category of combat support. Given current peacetime numbers of MP units forward-stationed overseas, dedicated support to air bases will probably not be possible. The number of MP units will not increase either, as troop ceilings would force a CINC to give up combat units in order to have enough MP forces to dedicate to air base security. During mobilization, US Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) MP units will deploy and some will be charged, among their many duties, with ABGD missions. The current

CHAPTER II

DEDICATED OR RESPONSIVE MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE?

The 1984 Memorandum of Agreement states, "Army units ... provide air base ground defense (ABGD) outside the base perimeter." (31:2) On the basis of that statement alone, it is understandable that a number of operating people such as Air Force security police planners believed from the beginning that the Army would provide dedicated assets to secure and fight on the external ground around an air base. This important terrain is called the Main Defense Area (MDA) and extends from the air base perimeter out to some three to five kilometers. (8:7) This piece of ground is obviously critical and it is here that the forces must detect, delay, and if possible, destroy enemy forces intent on attacking the target air base. Since this terrain is so critical, it is natural that any air base commander and his operator for ABGD (Chief, Security Police) would prefer dedicated rather than only response based Army support.

What the planners had in mind is unclear at this point. There is certainly some confusion at the working level; and frankly we believe that is the most important level of all--the people who will ultimately execute the concept. The dedicated versus responsive question was one of the unresolved issues at a recent ABGD conference held on 2 April 1986 attended by Air Force security police, Army major

recognize that these issues are evolving, dynamic, controversial, and critically important to the security of the Air Force and the Army through at least the 1990's. Due to the changing nature of these arrangements, it was necessary to disregard some written policy instruments which have been obviously overcome by events. Much of the most accurate contemporary information regarding air base ground defense has not yet been codified, although both service action agencies are busily engaged in final prepublication coordination.

In order to keep the focus on the contemporary issues and on the future, and to keep the paper a readable length, the authors purposely avoided any lengthy academic discussions of either history or theory. Several excellent documents filled with lengthy discussions of the history of air base ground defense are documented in the list of references at the end of this paper, and an entire body of academia has been spawned by the exhaustive examination of the morality of war. The authors want to keep the reader's focus where it can do some good: the tough problems of air base ground defense today and the tough solutions for tomorrow.

CHAPTER III

AIR FORCE SPACE TRANSFERS TO THE ARMY FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

Paragraph 8b of the 1984 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) reads, "The Air Force will transfer Air Force Reserve Component manpower spaces to the Army, if the Air Force Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) requirements exceed Army capabilities." (31:2) This item has caused some consternation and confusion among both Air Force and Army planners. The purpose of including this issue in this paper is simply to explain the present position.

Some 3600 Air Reserve Component manpower spaces (required, not funded) were deleted from ABGD programs as a result of Army assumption of external security responsibility. (15) Any space transfers from Air Force to Army after that deletion have to come from Air Reserve Component Security Police units with internal security missions. That is obviously unacceptable to the Air Force since internal air base security remains an Air Force responsibility.

During an Army-Air Force ABGD Pentagon conference in April 1986, the Air Force representative indicated that the Air Force could not transfer any spaces. This was due to the Reserve manpower deletions mentioned above. The representative further stated that this would apply even if the Army did eventually identify a specific shortfall in manpower to perform ABGD. (10) It might be possible, however, for the

Air Force to transfer dollars. Very simply, the Air Force no longer has any remaining external ABGD manpower it can transfer.

Current information from the Force Development Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, HQ Department of the Army (HQDA) indicates that there is no cry for spaces from the Army. (15) US Army Europe says it needs none; this is due largely to assured host nation support agreements. This includes the United Kingdom. Western Command (the Pacific) has not asked for spaces, nor has the Southern Command (Panama). In August 1986, a request did go to HQDA for spaces for ABGD from Alaska; it was returned for further justification and has not been received back at HQDA yet. Finally, CINCLANT (Atlantic Command) requested spaces for Army MP for the Azores. The request included not only ABGD forces but also MP for security of some port activities and communications nodes. This request was approved for Army Reserve Component MP manning in wartime. There was no Air Force space involvement in this approval. The Army recently funded some Army National Guard MP units currently in the POM earmarked for Southwest Asia; again, there was no Air Force involvement.

In summary, there is no "open issue" about space transfers from the Air Force to the Army for ABGD. Any CINC can, of course, on a case-by-case basis, request recognition for and approval of additional ABGD forces in the future. At present, however, there is no indication this will occur in the near term.

CHAPTER IV

TIMELY ARRIVAL OF MILITARY POLICE UNITS IN THEATER

AND

THE NEED FOR SECURITY POLICE TACTICAL TRAINING

There are those in the Air Force who doubt the ability of the Army Military Police to really live up to the 1984 Memorandum of Agreement (31) as required. It is true that under the restructuring of the Army in the "Army of Excellence," Military Police (MP) do in fact lose manpower on the active component side. This means that in wartime, many MP missions, including Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD), will undoubtedly fall to activated reserve component MP. The promptness of the arrival in theater of these reserve units is indeed an issue. Combat power, not combat support, generally has priority on existing time-phased force deployment lists (TPFDL). The same concern of planners exists in those places where host nation support (HNS) is a major part of ABGD, since HNS often comes from the reserve forces of the particular host nation. Strong HNS agreements are in being for the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, but it is true that in the event of a "bolt from the blue" attack, there would be some lag time in actual deployment of HN forces for ABGD. (15)

An unfortunate by-product of the later deployment of Army MP units to defend air bases is that these forces will have no way of knowing the air base defender's intent prior to entering the battle, as

the present Army capabilities will not allow dedication of specific units to specific air bases.

Having said that, should Air Force security police be trained appropriately and permitted to be employed external to an air base perimeter until someone else (Army MP or HN forces) assumes that mission? Probably so. Recent estimates of deployment capabilities of the US Army Reserve MP forces indicate that they will probably not be available in the theater where needed for a considerable amount of time, and thus the immediate active defense of air bases will fall to in-place Air Force security police forces.

The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) says that the Army and Air Force will develop joint procedures for rear area security. They must, of course, reflect the initiative whereby the Army assumes security responsibility for the ground external to an air base. (31:2) Neither the current Joint Service Agreement (30) nor the Joint Operational Concept (29) address a situation where the Army is not able, for whatever reason, to execute that responsibility. We believe Air Force doctrine should continue to reflect the reality that security police may have to be temporarily deployed external to a base perimeter until relieved. This would not, in our opinion, be a violation of the spirit and intent of the MOA. Rather, it provides a realistic solution to a temporary exigency.

The equipping of security police (SP) to perform that mission is still evolving, (33) but the training is ready to go. In accordance with initiative number nine of the 1984 Memorandum of Agreement (31:2),

the Army is preparing to conduct initial training for Air Force Security Police enlisted personnel. The overall plan of training involving three separate courses was finally approved on 9 December 1986. (16) The plan is to train some 7000 Air Force SP personnel annually. (3) Instruction will be done by the Army with an infantry cadre. The Army Infantry School had the lead in developing the program of instruction in coordination with the Army Military Police School. It is interesting that the US Army Military Police School will not be directly involved in the conduct of the training, despite the Military Police overall responsibility for the mission of external Air Base Ground Defense. (9)

On 9 July 1987, the pilot course for ABGD training of junior enlisted (airman basic[E1] through senior airman[E4]) SP will be conducted by the Army at Fort Dix, New Jersey. (16) This course will go into full swing on 1 October 1987. (3) This represents a full year slippage in the originally planned date. These junior enlisted (E1-E4) SP will be trained in a four week course covering weapons training, individual and squad size tactics, map reading, communications skills, and other tactical subjects. SP sergeants through master sergeant will attend a five week course, and junior officers (2nd lieutenant through captain) will take a nine week course. Hopefully, this training will go a long way in filling the void of forces which may exist for ABGD external to an air base perimeter early in a war situation. Unfortunately, training plans for senior SP officers and noncommissioned officers have not yet been finalized, and there appears to be some confusion as to how this target population will be instructed. (4)

Given the above developments, can the Army and Air Force work together to defend air bases successfully? The answer is yes, but only if some serious deficiencies are addressed and resolved by responsible individuals and agencies on both sides.

CHAPTER V

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES

The threat to air bases in a theater of war is both real and serious. In fact, current Soviet doctrine relies heavily on rear area combat and the disruption of friendly rear area operations. The Soviets accomplish this with SpetsNaz and Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) actions throughout the conduct of a major conflict. In effect, successful rear area operations force the opponent to fight at least a two-front war. The attractiveness of air bases as lucrative targets has long been recognized. The present reliance of war plans on air power's inherent speed, flexibility, and firepower as force multipliers in the AirLand battle scheme of operation makes air bases "must hit" targets for the enemy. (7:10) This emphasis is not new to aerospace doctrine, as Giulio Douhet wrote in 1921 that,

An enemy air force, in particular, should not be dealt with by combat in the air, but primarily by destruction of the ground installations.... (5:490)

The Joint Service Agreement formalizing these responsibilities was signed by the Chiefs of Staff on 25 April 1985. Thereby, several key command and control relationships were established. Air base commanders were now made responsible for the local ground defense of their bases. It was also recognized that defense of air bases against enemy ground attack will of necessity involve operations of friendly ground forces within the confines of the air base perimeter and external

to the air base. (30)

Present delineation of the roles and missions of these friendly ground forces makes the US Air Force responsible for the internal defense of its bases. The US Army has been assigned primary responsibility for defensive operations conducted external to air bases. Additionally, the Air Force is also now responsible for exercising command and control over those forces committed to the external defense. (29) The successful defense of air bases in war may well hinge on the successful and effective execution of this new and untested critical Air Force tasking. No one really knows if the Air Force can accomplish it, given existing serious shortfalls in experience, equipment, doctrine, and command structure. This section will examine these potential problem areas, in hope of generating increased concern on the part of Air Force planners leading to resolutions prior to the commencement of the next war.

Within Air Force security police doctrine, there appears to be some ambiguity as to precisely who will bear the actual burden of command during Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) operations involving external friendly forces. In several documents, the "air base commander" is singled out as the individual bearing responsibility for the successful defense of the Air Force installation. Other documents point to the "wing commander/senior tactical commander" as the individual in charge. (29:6,7) Further complicating matters is the often-stated assumption in both Army and Air Force doctrinal proposals (25:2,33) and in the July 1986 "Joint Operational Concept for Air Base

Ground Defense" that the Air Force base Chief, Security Police will be the "commander of the internal defense force...", and as such will exercise actual operational control (OPCON) over any Army forces operating in the main defense area (MDA) immediately outside the base perimeter. (29:5)

At present there is almost unanimous agreement among Army and Air Force ABGD planners that almost all US Air Force wing commanders, senior tactical commanders, and air base group commanders lack the experience, background, and training requisite to the effective exercise of OPCON of ground combat forces engaged in actions external to US Air Force installations. Despite sound recommendations to initiate training of senior officers in these skills, (22) no effective actions have yet been initiated to bring the required training on-line. (1) Experience at Tactical Air Command Blue Flag exercises has shown that training and experience in command and control are at a low level. (13:35) Further complicating the situation is the lack of combat experience likely to be encountered within the ranks of the base Chiefs of Security Police, who function both as the "designated representatives" of the base commander for ABGD matters in peacetime, and are the commanders of air base ground forces at a tactical level. (17:2,3) Although concepts of communication and coordination with friendly supporting forces are taught at the USAF Security Police Academy as part of the ABGD Senior Officer Course, (23:9) the actual exercise of these skills is seldom accomplished. Instead, the USAF Security Police Academy continues to rely heavily on the Distributed Area Defense (DAD) concept whereby Air

Force Security Police ABGD forces attempt to secure the air base and the Main Defense Area (MDA) surrounding it with no external ABGD force assistance. (4) Unfortunately, this concept has now been proven to be ineffective at best. (22)

The Air Force Office of the Chief of Security Police (AFOSP) is well aware of most of these deficiencies, and work is underway to clarify inconsistencies as time permits. For example, significant progress has been made in identifying security police ABGD manpower requirements and in subsequently meeting those requirements via time phased force deployment list (TPFDL) reinforcements. At forward operating bases (FOB) in war, there will be large numbers of security police forces operating mainly within the base perimeter, in the close defense area (CDA). There may also be Army Military Police (MP) forces assigned the external ABGD mission in the main defense area (MDA) which may be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of either the air base or senior tactical US Air Force commander (assuming resolution of the issue of designation of the senior responsible official). At present, the wartime command and control (C2) structure for US Air Force ABGD forces has not been defined above squadron-level. (19:1) AFOSP ABGD planners have recommended the creation of an ABGD Security Police Group unit type code (UTC) element which will provide the requisite command and control of subordinate ABGD squadrons, thus alleviating the present "flat" command structure of exceptionally large reinforced security police squadrons, and providing needed staff elements to allow the ABGD Security Police Group to function effectively. (19-7)

Concerns with the provision of specific ABGD Intelligence (the "S-2" function) are discussed elsewhere in this paper. AFOSP ABGD planners further recommend the functional positions of these ABGD group commanders be placed under the direct control of the "wing commander/senior tactical commander", citing the need for the wing/senior tactical commander to be advised directly by the ABGD force commander who should have the best available information and expertise on ABGD matters. One of several convincing arguments in favor of this realignment of the chain of command is the ultimate responsibility of the senior tactical commander to decide whether to suspend sortie generation or continue flying in the face of ground attack. (19:3) The requirement for a clear chain of command for ABGD operations has not been fully satisfied, and remains situationally-dependent. The current concept of operations for ABGD calls for the USAF to retain command and control of ABGD internal and external operations through the Level II threat (attack by enemy tactical units "smaller than battalion size, particularly unconventional warfare forces"). (29:8) It is difficult to conceive of a situation in a Level II threat operation where a senior tactical USAF commander might not be tempted to exercise command and control directly over the ABGD forces involved.

Where a Level III threat rears its very ugly head, and the threat force exceeds the defensive capabilities of the air base, a tactical combat force (TCF) will be required to defeat the enemy. The TCF is a combined arms organization tasked to conduct a rear operation. This TCF may be a unit from the main battle area, a unit reconstituting

after extended combat, a unit passing through the area, or a unit under the OPCON of the rear operations officer (operating through the Army's Rear Area Operations Center). This same Rear Battle Officer then will begin to direct the allocation of ABGD forces to the TCF. This could include Security Police or Military Police forces dedicated to the defense of the air base, but only after coordination with the air base commander (assuming he is in charge). The purpose of this coordination is to allow the air base to retain those defensive assets needed to protect critical facilities. This process will require the air base Chief, Security Police (ground force commander) to keep the air base commander informed of those minimal assets required to insure continuous protection of critical air base assets. (29:7)

This assumes, of course, that the air base is not one of those assets which may receive little or no external help. This unhappy condition could arise, as the "air component commander" is required to coordinate with the joint force commander to assist in determining ABGD force allocations. The echelon commander then allocates forces for rear battle operations based on the threat, the availability of host nation assets, the overall concept of operation, and the theater commander's priorities. (29:5) Much of previous US Army planning did not take into account the need to provide for the external defense of air bases, and one can only wonder how the inclusion of these assets into lists of critical assets will transpire, and what relative priority will be placed on US Air Force operational bases and other installations. Obviously, the Army MP forces tasked with the protection of wide areas

of the rear area cannot provide dedicated service to each asset requiring protection.

In fact, the Army Rear Battle Officer is also charged to decide, in consultation with the air base commanders, and based on the threat and forces available, which procedures provide the greatest overall security to the air bases and rear area. The defense needs and availability of ABGD forces will significantly impact the decision. The Army acknowledges the most responsive command and control relationship to be one where the external ABGD forces could be placed OPCON to every air base in the theater of operations. Unfortunately, the Army also acknowledges that this will seldom be the case, and suggests an alternative to the rear battle officer. Normally, available MP forces will be assigned an area security mission under the control of an MP brigade and placed under the OPCON of the air base commander by the rear battle officer when threat forces are anticipated within the main defense area (MDA) of the air base. This option, although the most plausible in the majority of scenarios, is also less than perfect, for as the Army agrees, the transfer of OPCON must occur in sufficient time to allow effective employment of the units. This option should ideally only apply to an austere environment or during the initial phases of a contingency operation. (29:8) Unfortunately for both forces, this transfer of OPCON upon the incursion of a threat force into the MDA will yield an MP force OPCON to a commander whose critical defense intentions are likely to remain at least partially masked by the exigencies of a developing battle situation. Into this potentially confusing and

dangerous situation also enter the forces belonging to the tactical combat force (TCF).

Current Army and Air Force joint operational concepts for ABGD allow for TCF to conduct screening operations within the MDA under the operational control of the rear battle officer (not the Air Force base/wing/senior commander), and may augment the air base ground defense when the threat is anticipated or identified. (29:7) Obviously, this mode of operation conflicts with the previously announced policy on command and control, unless the underlying assumption is that TCF would not appear near any air base in response to less than a full-blown Level III threat operation, when the TCF would be in overall charge. Current ABGD concepts call for the committing of a TCF against a Level III threat, and the assigning of an appropriate area of operations and mission to defeat the threat. Under such circumstances, ground units within this area of operation (AO) come under the OPCON of the TCF commander until the threat is neutralized. When an air base is involved, the rear battle officer directs the transfer of OPCON of [Army or other external] ABGD forces to the TCF. Upon completion of the mission, the TCF commander relinquishes operational control of ABGD forces. (29:7) Complicated as this is, it is not the only OPCON change required by current concepts.

Fortunately, both Army and Air Force planners have recognized the need for close and continuing cooperation between air base security police and supporting military police forces (assuming such forces are actually present in the MDA) to conduct effective operations and prevent

fratricide. Naturally, this requires the security police forces to be constantly aware of the disposition of the military police forces in the MDA outside of the air base perimeter. The proposed military police defense concept acknowledges that if a threat force penetrates deeply into the defended MDA, the MP commander could request that the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) commit the mounted SP reserve flight (mobile reserve, or MR) to concentrate mass and firepower to destroy that force, or to at least conduct delaying operations until the arrival of a TCF. (25:34,35) Unfortunately, this concept requires the MR to be placed OPCON to the MP forces, who in turn are OPCON to the BDOC. A complicating factor is the present lack of common communications equipment and procedures which would allow these forces effective communications.

From an Air Force viewpoint, the Base Defense Operations Center is the critical node in the communications network for ABGD. Typically, all ground defense operations are controlled from the BDOC, which has upwards, lateral, and downwards communications and reporting responsibilities. The BDOC reports upward to the Wing Operations Center (WOC), keeping the wing/senior commander informed of all ground defense matters affecting air operations. Lateral reporting responsibilities include survival and recovery actions with the Survival and Recovery Center (SRC), ABGD matters with the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC), ground defense interface with the Air Defense Cell in the WOC, intelligence matters with the Wing Intelligence and AFOSI agencies, and appropriate host nation force headquarters. (20:9,10) Unfortunately,

experience has shown time and time again that this critical ABGD command and communications node can be exploited or degraded by enemy forces. Extensive jamming can be expected and communications security weaknesses will undoubtedly be exploited by enemy forces. Therefore, it is critical to provide communications which maximize security, robustness, and redundancy to insure reliable and survivable communications in a wartime environment. (13:35)

Unfortunately, the command and control difficulties for the air base ground defenders may in fact be complicated by the arrival of reinforcing Air Force support forces, only partially trained in self-defense measures, but armed with M-16 rifles. Present Air Force policy is that each skill area with a mobility commitment conducts its own wartime skills training. There is a notable lack of interface between those skills, or between those units tasked to deploy to the same wartime locations. It can logically be assumed that an attack by a Level II threat force would produce many casualties from fratricide, due to the chaos, stress, and uncertainty of combat, and the lack of an effective command and communications network to control these forces. In order to decisively defeat the threat, all air base armed forces will have to be able to fight together as a single integrated unit. Air Force logisticians are beginning to believe that, "if we are going to be responsible and successful in defeating ground attacks against our air bases, then we ought to start thinking, training, and fighting as soldiers in addition to being professional airmen." (7:10)

Obviously, much work remains to be done in the area of

communications and command and control if air base ground defense is to be accomplished effectively. This area is so sensitive that fixes for identified problems should be undertaken as soon as possible. Otherwise, our ability to defend air bases against ground attack will remain at risk throughout the 1990's.

CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE

The importance of timely and accurate intelligence support for the successful defense of air bases and other installations in wartime is almost universally acknowledged. The difficulty in selecting the proper mix of agencies and in the allocation of tasks in this area continues to flaw the air base operability/survivability/ground defense efforts. Unfortunately, this is a dilemma which can be accurately labelled as "reinvention of the wheel", for the Air Force has apparently willingly chosen to ignore the lessons of the past.

While it is indeed dangerous to attempt to base all planning for future conflict on past conflicts, it is even more dangerous to completely ignore any lessons learned from past conflicts, and to blindly forge ahead in the hope that things will work out somehow.

Proposed policy for the Army military police support of air base ground defense is based on the assumption that the ground combat intelligence functions of the air base itself will be performed by an Air Force security police officer with an intelligence background. (25:37) The reality of the present situation is that the Air Force security police have no ground combat intelligence capabilities beyond those provided by other agencies, primarily the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). Traditionally, AFOSI has assisted the security police in coordination with police investigative agencies

outside normal security police jurisdictional boundaries, including the limited dissemination of tactical counterintelligence (TCI) data.

(32:26) While this arrangement works relatively well in peacetime, a different approach is required in hostile environments.

In Vietnam, the security police community made overtures to both the AFOSI and Air Force intelligence in an effort to secure adequate ground combat intelligence support. Air Force Intelligence predictably was absorbed in producing intelligence for air combat operations, and was reluctant to sign up to providing additional support in the form of ground combat intelligence for air base defense. (6:139) This resulted in the security police, with some assistance from the AFOSI's Area Source Program, setting up a "self-help" system of intelligence collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination, and in doing so slighting their primary mission. (6:144,153) In the latter stages of the conflict, the routine rotation/replacement program was altered to give each security police squadron in Vietnam one security police officer and one security police noncommissioned officer who had received formal intelligence training at Fort Holabird, Maryland. At these bases and at Seventh Air Force Headquarters, these became centers for securing base defense intelligence information processed by other agencies. In Vietnam, this self-help intelligence system was viewed as a regrettably necessary evil by the security police, who were also spectacularly unsuccessful in obtaining required support from supply, transportation, communications, and civil engineering. This view was not shared by the Seventh Air Force Director of Intelligence, who

informed his Air Staff counterpart that the self-help system was "effective and ... geared especially to operations in Southeast Asia" and that "no major changes are required at either headquarters or base level in the intelligence function as related to base defense." In contrast, the views of the majority of the base security police units saddled with the program were reflected in the appraisal of the Seventh Air Force Director of Security Police in his 1970 end-of-tour report. He asserted that the security police were,

plunged into the intelligence business in Vietnam not out of any desire to build empires, but because [the] mission made it absolutely necessary. Evaluation of the entire program reveals that it would be in the best interest of the USAF if the Air Base Ground Combat Intelligence needs could be met by an accommodation with intelligence experts. This will undoubtedly provide a superior product and would free a sizeable number of security police to perform their primary mission. (6:144,145)

Current Air Force doctrine lays heavy tasking on the Air Force Intelligence community to assist in this function, but does not clearly assign primary responsibility at base level. Not only has the issue of primary responsibility for ground combat intelligence not been resolved, the security police have lost organic intelligence capabilities, and now rely almost exclusively on external agencies which are still unable and unwilling to perform the tasks. Compounding this problem is the lack of an effective command structure above squadron level to accommodate necessary combat intelligence-related staff functions. A fix by cognizant elements of the Air Force Office of Security Police is underway, however. A currently proposed Security Police Air Base Ground Defense Group structure will provide a dedicated intelligence (S-2)

function led by an intelligence specialist, with AFOSI and SP representation, which will

- a. Manage ground combat intelligence (GCI) collection, analysis, planning and tasking.
- b. Seek combat information and GCI from US and allied sources.
- c. Analyze the ground threat within the air base ground defense AO [area of operations].
- d. Determine map requirements.
- e. Collate, analyze, produce, and disseminate GCI in the form of oral briefings, written reports, and messages.
- f. Monitor operational security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) for the group commander.
- g. Supervise the processing of captured personnel and equipment.
- h. Provide operational planning support to the S-3 [operations] and squadrons. (19:A3-1,2)

A recent test of the efficiency of the proposed S-2 security police group intelligence staff function was documented in the January 1986 SALTY DEMO final report, which was classified overall Secret. For the demonstration, the S-2 section was manned with a mixture of security police and AFOSI personnel. A recent report noted that the AFOSI performed the S-2 functions with both diligence and professionalism during SALTY DEMO. Unfortunately, the AFOSI has now reportedly declined this mission, citing budgetary and personnel shortfalls as primary reasons, and a lack of training. (32:26-27)

This becomes all the more disturbing when one realizes that now no Air Force agency will claim the ground combat intelligence mission as primary. Sadly, the Air Force will get little help from the Army, as the Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense tasks

the Air Force [with] retain[ing] primary responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) operations in support of ABGD. Air Force assets will provide intelligence and counterintelligence information to the BDOC, which will coordinate with the RAOC on appropriate intelligence affecting the air base. (29:8)

Clearly, a more precise definition of Air Force roles and missions in the provision of the ground combat intelligence (GCI) function is overdue. For obvious reasons, the security police can no longer be reasonably expected to "self-help" themselves to intelligence in a wartime environment. The integrated ground combat intelligence approach proposed in the forthcoming revision to Air Force Regulation 206-2 has much merit, and deserves serious consideration. (20:11) To ignore this problem area is to invite disaster in any future conflict involving Air Base Ground Defense.

CHAPTER VII

HOST NATION SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE

The US Army Operational Concept for Host Nation Support describes wartime situations where it is desirable to use host nation support (HNS) to perform MP missions in lieu of US Army Military Police (MP) units. Among the types of support is the mission to secure critical facilities. (24:18,19) Securing air bases is certainly an appropriate mission for HNS although it is not specifically addressed as an example (the USA-USAF Memorandum of Agreement was signed in May 1984, after this publication). The military police operations matrix in this pamphlet (24:20,21) indicates that maximum use of HNS is desirable as a planning goal for the mission of securing fixed installations. This includes installations in the Communications Zone (COMMZ) as well as in the combat zone, and applies to forward deployed forces as well as supporting contingency operations. For Air Base Ground Defense, HNS units can be light infantry or security units.

Progress in the host nation support arena in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been very positive in many areas, including Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD). The assured support (defined as established or significantly evolving HNS agreements) is extensive and, without getting into classified numbers, will go a long way in satisfying basic US air base requirements in the FRG. (15) Agreements in the United Kingdom (UK) appear to be sound as well, and Italy is

next. (14) The existence of such support again validates the US Army MP acting in a response mode rather than being dedicated to defense of an air base.

There are those who maintain we should not rely too heavily upon HNS agreements since we really do not know what will happen to various forces and governments in the event of war. The authors believe, however, that the US has no viable alternative. HNS agreements are a most important part of any alliance and we must buy that as an acceptable way of conducting the business of ABGD. Europe is held up as an example. Assured HNS in that theater is a primary reason why the Commander in Chief of US Army Forces there has not yet requested additional MP forces for ABGD. (9)

CHAPTER VIII

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT FOR ABGD OPERATIONS

Successful defense of an air base against Level II or Level III threat activities without friendly indirect fire support will be extremely difficult at best. At worst, the air base defense force will be defeated, the air base overrun, and the enemy provided with an operational base. With these concerns in mind, both Army and Air Force planners have addressed the need for these fires in applicable plans and other documents. It is sad that this needed component of air base ground defense can not be provided. The implications do not bode well for successful ABGD operations in the near future.

Current Air Force ABGD doctrine acknowledges that "usually, there will be insufficient field artillery assets to service the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the main battle area, and the rear area at the same time. Therefore, the priority of fire is usually given to the ground combat forces on the FEBA and in the main battle area." (27:4-40)

Although the Air Force ABGD doctrine also mentions the availability of close air support (CAS) as a substitute for indirect fire support, this element of a combined arms operation will be notable by its absence in the rear area. The priorities limiting field artillery support for ABGD will also apply to limited CAS assets, limiting their availability in the rear area. (21:27)

The Air Force Security Police have a very limited organic indirect fire capability, consisting of only 27 81mm mortar tubes worldwide. Obviously, this is very far short of current requirements for ABGD. Compounding this problem is a current and projected shortfall in appropriate ammunition for these tubes. (33) Further concern is generated by a noticeable reluctance on the part of the security police to employ these tubes in other than an illumination capacity. (25:53)

In summary, although Army and Air Force ABGD planners have agreed on the absolute need for indirect fires and CAS to effectively prosecute defense of an air base against Level II and Level III activities, these assets are not likely to be available in sufficient quantity to positively influence the outcome of the contest.

CHAPTER IX

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES

Some military police (MP) planners consider logistic support of Army forces conducting air base ground defense (ABGD) as a problem. The Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense simply states that combat service support for Army units conducting ABGD missions are normally furnished by the appropriate Army support unit. (29:8) Any support from the air base would then need to be described in a given situational operations plan (OPLAN). The MP doctrinal proponent (the Army Military Police School), however, is leaning toward MP units obtaining all classes of supply and services from the supported air base, with the rationale that it is simply more expedient to do so. (25:44) (Note that this is not final approved Army doctrine as of the date of this paper.) Normal support bases for the Army MP unit will probably be distant and MP supply sections and staffs are quite austere. This arrangement obviously requires a considerable amount of prior coordination between supporting and supported units. For a long-term arrangement, formal interservice support agreements (ISSA) are necessary.

Funneling MP-unique items into Air Force supply channels would not be easy. Examples may include ammunition for the squad automatic weapon (SAW), unique chemical alarms, and until we all have 9mm pistols, sufficient caliber .45 ammunition. Maintenance support may also be a

problem in such areas as radio repair, as there is a lack of compatible systems between the services.

There certainly are problems in service support, but they are perhaps not as great as some would believe. MP units have always operated long distances from their higher headquarters and from their designated support agency. They are used to obtaining assistance from whatever Army support outfit is in the area. This does not mean circumvention of the logistic system by using the "good-ole-boy" method. This simply means that wherever there is an established air base, there will most likely be an Army support unit somewhere in the vicinity. The higher headquarters of the committed MP unit can coordinate with that unit for the required support. In the situation of an air base which is truly remote from other Army units, then certainly service support can and should be arranged with the air base. This situation will undoubtedly be the exception, not the norm. In summary, logistic support of MP units conducting ABGD is achievable, but should not normally be achieved through air base resources.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE

DEDICATED OR RESPONSIVE MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE?

Army military police (MP) resources will not normally permit dedication of MP units to specific Air Base Ground Defense missions. The Military Police will operate on an area security basis. Not all planning documents reflect this reality, and a substantial number of planners may not be fully cognizant of this fact.

AIR FORCE SPACE TRANSFERS TO THE ARMY FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

No space transfers from the Air Force to the Army are possible, despite the inclusion of this provision in the historic 1984 Memorandum of Agreement. Additive Army requirements have not been fully identified.

TIMELY ARRIVAL OF MILITARY POLICE UNITS IN THEATER AND THE NEED FOR SECURITY POLICE TACTICAL TRAINING.

Depending on the actual war scenario, adequate military police (MP) forces may not be available to perform the Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) mission at the beginning of hostilities. Mobilizing US Army Reserve component forces takes time and there are not large numbers of

military police on the front end of mobility deployment plans. Host nation support forces also need time to mobilize. Air Force security police will be receiving enhanced tactical training from the Army beginning 1 October 1987. Not all USAF ABGD training requirements have been satisfied.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES.

The Air Force has serious deficiencies in experience, doctrine, and command structure for Air Base Ground Defense, particularly in regard to the communication, command, and control of friendly forces external to the air bases. There is ambiguity as to who will be in charge in a combat operation. Senior Air Force officers lack experience and training in ground combat operations. The Air Force Chiefs of Security Police at base level are gradually losing combat experience through attrition, and USAF Security Police Academy training does not yield experience in command and control of other friendly forces external to the base. Wartime command and control structures for Air Base Ground Defense do not allow for adequate control of both line and staff agencies, despite adequate numbers of USAF security police being identified for air base ground defense mobility taskings. Security Police Air Base Ground Defense groups, if funded, will not be functionally aligned to execute their mission if left under the air base commander. The handoff of operational control of combat forces under the level III threat attack is unpracticed and exceptionally situationally-dependent. Contrary to the provisions of the Memorandum

of Agreement, Army doctrine will not place all forces under the operational control of the air base or senior Air Force tactical commander.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE.

There is confusion within the Air Force and between the Air Force and the Army as to precisely who will have the primary responsibility for the conduct of the various ground combat intelligence tasks, particularly at base level. The Air Force Office of Security Police has proposed a fix in the forthcoming AFR 206-2 which will provide a more integrated function for air base ground combat intelligence.

HOST NATION SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE.

Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) is an appropriate mission for Host Nation Support (HNS). The current agreements are a major factor in ABGD planning. Further agreements are required to ensure more complete coverage of air base assets.

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

Indirect fire support will be essential to the successful defense of air bases against level II or level III activity. It is probable that US Army rear area indirect fire support will not be sufficient to make a significant contribution to ABGD. The Air Force security police have a very limited organic indirect fire capability.

Current USAF thinking does not envision the primary use of these assets in an active defense mode.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES.

Army Military Police forces executing Air Base Ground Defense missions can be supported logistically. The Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense is sound; normal service support arrangements will suffice under normal conditions.

CHAPTER XI

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE IN THE 1990'S

DEDICATED OR RESPONSIVE MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE?

Army and Air Force planners and decision makers must not assume dedicated Army Military Police force support will exist for ABGD. A graduated series of realistic exercises should be conducted to clearly show what degree of support is available, and plans and doctrine should be adjusted accordingly.

AIR FORCE SPACE TRANSFERS TO THE ARMY FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

US Army Military Police and theater commanders should carefully weigh and announce their needs for additive requirements for ABGD and ensure these are accurately reflected through the normal Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

TIMELY ARRIVAL OF MILITARY POLICE UNITS IN THEATER AND THE NEED FOR SECURITY POLICE TACTICAL TRAINING.

Air Force security police must take full advantage of the training opportunities presented by the Army through the various courses to be conducted starting in 1987. Security police must continue to plan

and train for the interim defense of air bases without substantial external support. Army and Air Force ABGD planners must expedite the resolution of unsatisfied tactical training needs for senior USAF security police officers and noncommissioned officers.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES.

The Air Force must work strenuously to overcome serious deficiencies in doctrine and command structure for ABGD. The lack of unity of command of air base ground defense forces under the present conflicting and confusing Army and Air Force doctrines should be recognized as a potentially fatal flaw in an otherwise healthy roles and missions evolution. Although specified in the existing Joint Service Agreements, the present unwieldy Air Force operational control of large numbers of ground forces engaged in external air base ground defense should be reexamined. If evaluation shows it is indeed more efficient and effective for the Air Force to retain operational control of these ground forces, then communication, command, and control of both security police and other friendly supporting forces external to the base must be extensively taught at the USAF Security Police Academy, the USAF Commanders' Professional Development School, and at theater-unique command courses. Serious consideration should be given to teaching these critical skills to Air Force and Army personnel in a joint environment, as the conduct of air base ground defense will undoubtedly be a joint undertaking. The combat experience of Air Force base-level Chiefs of security police must be enhanced through extensive training

and practice of essential wartime command and control tasks in both local and national site training.

The handoff of operational control under level III attack conditions must be practiced at least in command post exercises. If the smooth transition of this critical control of combat forces proves too difficult to execute under exercise conditions, then a serious revision of current complex command and control doctrine may be in order, perhaps giving constant control of external forces to the entity which will control them in the worst case scenario.

Regardless of the outcome of a reexamination of the external command and control of external air base ground defense, the presently proposed security police ABGD groups should be approved as wartime-tasked entities and be functionally aligned directly under the senior Air Force tactical commander on air bases, who should be clearly designated as the individual responsible for the ground defense of the air base. The ability of the security police and military police forces to communicate must be further enhanced through the acquisition of robust, survivable, redundant, and secure communications equipment for the security police, who should cooperate in development efforts with the US Army.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE.

Army and Air Force ABGD planners must clarify primary responsibility for the provision of ground combat intelligence to air base defenders at base level. The integrated approach, involving

intelligence, AFOSI, and security police should be pursued as the most promising solution.

HOST NATION SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE.

Army ABGD planners must pursue the provision of host nation support of ABGD as the most practical method of assuring external support for air base ground defense. All existing overseas air bases should be covered by such agreements without delay, thus freeing limited military police assets to cover contingencies involving ABGD where preplanned host nation support may not be available.

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

Air Force ABGD planners must robust both the numbers and types of assets provided to overseas bases for indirect fire support, as these assets will be critical to successful ABGD. The present Air Force reluctance to employ these assets in an active defense mode must be overcome, and their use should be routinely practiced. This means that sufficient numbers of trained indirect fire personnel must be in place to assist in the ground defense of air bases. The search for munitions and weapons with improved lethality and accuracy for Air Force security police indirect fire support of air base ground defense operations should be pursued, to enable the security police to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE FORCES.

Current Army planning to use normal logistic support arrangements for military police units engaged in external ABGD operations should continue. This is as expressed in the Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense, and will satisfy the immediate needs of external ABGD forces in most cases.

APPENDIX 1

LEVELS OF THREAT FOR AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE

LEVEL I. The level I threat is posed by agents, saboteurs, partisans, and terrorist groups. Safeguarding nuclear weapons and other high priority resources against this threat is the primary mission of the Air Force Security Police. The security police (SP) are specifically organized, trained, and equipped, to defend the base against the level I threat.

LEVEL II. The level II threat includes tactical units smaller than battalion size, particularly unconventional warfare forces (for example, SPETSNAZ and Ranger-Commandos) whose primary tasks are covert reconnaissance and sabotage missions to disrupt friendly sortie generation. These forces may also use standoff weapons from outside the base boundaries, or they may infiltrate the base and employ explosive devices, silent killing techniques, and other methods to accomplish their objectives. Equipped with a diversity of weapons, they possess the capability of engaging in combat with friendly ground defense forces, if necessary, to accomplish their mission. However, these enemy forces normally operate in small groups, avoiding detection to increase their probability of success. SP and military police (MP) are organized, trained and equipped to defend against the level II threat.

LEVEL III. The level III threat is posed by tactical military units of battalion size or larger resulting from overt enemy heliborne, airborne, amphibious, or ground force operations. A level III threat will probably include an air base as part of a larger, coordinated plan, rather than as an individual or separate target. Friendly force response to the level III threat involves the commitment of the requisite Tactical Combat Forces (TCFs) to destroy the threat.

NOTE: Description of these threat levels taken from the Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense (Army Pamphlet 525-24/ Air Force Pamphlet 206-4), 15 July 1986.

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